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Abstract 
This paper examines the impact of bank consolidation on mortgage rates in order to 
evaluate the extent to which mortgage markets are competitive. Mortgage markets are 
decentralized and so rates are determined through a search and negotiation process. The 
primary effect of a merger therefore is to reduce the number of partners available with 
whom to negotiate, although it can also change the characteristics of the product, and 
impact the search effort of consumers. Using a Canadian merger as a case study, we find 
that, overall, consolidation had little effect on rates suggesting that, on average, the 
mortgage market is fairly competitive. However, a decomposition of the aggregate 
treatment effect reveals important heterogeneity in the impact of the merger. We find that 
consumers gathering multiple quotes are affected by the merger, while those who do not 
search are not. These results suggest that market power originates in large part from the 
presence of asymmetric search costs. 
JEL classification: L1, G2  
Bank classification: Financial institutions; Financial services; Interest rates 
Résumé 
Les auteurs examinent l’effet des regroupements bancaires sur les taux d’intérêt 
hypothécaires afin d’évaluer le degré de compétitivité des marchés hypothécaires. 
Comme ces marchés sont décentralisés, les taux y sont déterminés au moyen d’un 
processus de recherche et de négociation. Dès lors, la fusion de deux institutions a pour 
principale conséquence de réduire le nombre de partenaires potentiels avec qui négocier, 
bien qu’elle puisse aussi s’accompagner de changements dans les caractéristiques du 
produit et se répercuter sur les efforts de recherche des consommateurs. Prenant pour 
étude de cas la fusion de deux banques canadiennes, les auteurs notent que celle-ci a eu 
dans l’ensemble peu d’incidence sur les taux pratiqués, ce qui donne à penser que le 
marché hypothécaire est relativement compétitif. Toutefois, la décomposition de l’effet 
moyen observé révèle que la fusion a eu une incidence très variable selon les ménages. 
Les consommateurs qui font des démarches auprès de plusieurs institutions ont été 
touchés par la fusion, mais pas les autres. Ces résultats indiquent que le pouvoir de 
marché tient en grande partie à la présence de coûts de recherche asymétriques. 
Classification JEL : L1, G2 
Classification de la Banque : Institutions financières; Services financiers; Taux d’intérêt 
 
 1. INTRODUCTION
Although North American and European mortgage markets are highly concentrated, pricing
may still be competitive. Understanding the extent to which pricing in mortgage markets is com-
petitive is central to the design and evaluation of policies meant to regulate mortgage markets.
These include antitrust policies regarding the approval of bank mergers, regulations constraining
the scope of bank activities, and policies affecting banks’ costs of funding such as those targeting
capital or securitization.
In theory, several institutional features suggest that mortgage markets should be competitive:
contracts are homogeneous, rates are negotiable, and, due to loan securitization, for a given con-
sumer costs are mostly common across lenders. Moreover, in the market that we study, lenders are
fully protected against the risk of default by a government insurance program, which standard-
izes the lending conditions across ﬁnancial institutions. These features allow informed consumers
to gather multiple quotes, and obtain an interest rate that reﬂects the expected lending cost, even
with a small number of competing lenders. In practice, however, consumers differ in their ability
to understand the subtleties of ﬁnancial contracts, and their willingness to negotiate and search
for multiple quotes. Indeed, recent surveys in Canada and in the United States show that, while
some buyers get multiple quotes when shopping for their mortgage contract, nearly half only
get one. This heterogeneity can induce price dispersion, even among homogeneous contracts, in
which lenders offer better rates to consumers that are able to gather multiples quotes and/or that
have good bargaining skills.
1
In this paper, we take advantage of the quasi-experimental variation created by a merger be-
tweentwoimportantlendersinCanadatoevaluatethelevelofpricecompetitionamongmortgage
providers.
2 Unlike retail markets often used to study the effect of concentration on prices, mort-
gage markets are decentralized, and contract terms for each individual are determined through a
search and negotiation process. Therefore a lender’s ability to exercise market power vis-a-vis a
borrower depends not just on differentiation like in standard retail markets, but also on the bor-
rower’s search and negotiation ability. In this context a merger effectively reduces the number of
negotiating partners accessible to consumers. We are interested in studying the impact of losing
a lending option on consumer-level transaction rates. For borrowers with poor search and nego-
tiation ability, there should be little or no impact of losing a lender. In contrast, searchers may be
affected depending on how competitive the market is. If the market is not perfectly competitive,
losing a lender will lower borrowers’ bargaining power, and lead to higher prices. On the other
hand, if the market is competitive, the number of lenders in consumers’ choice-sets should not
affect the discount they receive.
1The presence of ﬁnancial intermediaries, such as mortgage brokers and real-estate agents, can attenuate some of these
information frictions, but also create new problems such as exclusion (some banks refuse to deal with brokers), and
repeated interactions leading to tacit collusion between brokers and banks. Hall and Woodward (2010), for example,
ﬁnd that mortgage brokers in the United States capitalized on their information advantage to over-charge borrowers
leading up to the housing crisis.
2For conﬁdentiality reasons we cannot reveal the exact details of the merger.
1To conduct our empirical analysis we exploit a detailed data-set containing a random sample
of all new mortgages administered by the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation; a federal
crown corporation responsible for insuring the loans of home buyers who require insurance un-
der the National Housing Act. These data provide administrative information on contract terms,
household characteristics, and market-level characteristics. The richness of this consumer infor-
mation, in combination with lender-level location data, allow us to identify the causal effect of
the loss of a lending option on transaction interest rates by exploiting the sharp changes in the
choice-set of consumers induced by the merger.
We use a difference-in-difference estimation strategy to quantify this effect. This strategy relies
on the fact that most consumers shop for their mortgage contract locally, and that the merger
differentially impacted the structure of local-markets across the country. In particular, roughly
sixty per cent of consumers in our data-set had both merged entities in their neighborhoods prior
to the merger, while the remaining had only one or neither. The latter set of borrowers represents
a natural control group. This strategy has been recently used to study the impact of mergers in
gasoline markets (e.g. Hastings (2004), Hastings and Gilbert (2005), and Houde (2011)), in the
cement industry (e.g. Hortacsu and Syverson (2007)) and in the health-care industry (e.g. Dafny
et al. (2011)), among others. See Ashenfelter et al. (2009) for a survey of this literature.
The main contribution of this paper is to document the important heterogeneity in the reaction
of ﬁrms and consumers to a merger. This is in contrast to most of the literature studying the effects
of horizontal mergers, which has focused on posted prices. We exploit observed differences in
the choice set of consumers and their ﬁnancial characteristics to estimate heterogenous treatment
effects. We also estimate the distribution of treatment effects across unobserved consumer types
using a semi-parametric estimator proposed by Athey and Imbens (2006).
Our results can be summarized as follows. We estimate that the merger led to an average inter-
est rate increase in treated markets of 6 basis points (bps). For a $100,000 loan, we estimate that
the merger led to a $4 increase in monthly payments (or $240 over the ﬁve years of the contract).
Overall this effect is small, and suggests that the average consumer is able to extract a large share
of the transaction surplus through search and negotiation. However, decomposing the effect of
the merger by observed transaction characteristics reveals important asymmetries. Consumers
transacting with the merged entity experienced the largest price increase: up to 15 bps, compared
to 5 bps for consumers selecting a competing institution. These results are consistent with the
idea that the merger improved the quality of the complementary services offered by the merged
entity, and that it changed the mix of consumers that each lender serves. We also ﬁnd that the
merger led to more intense search efforts: the aggregate probabilities of dealing with a broker or
switching ﬁnancial-institutions (a proxy for search intensity and effort) increased by nearly 6%
in the treated markets (relative to comparable controls). This likely attenuated the market power
increase associated with the merger.
Using the estimator proposed by Athey and Imbens (2006) we analyze the distribution of the
treatment effect across unobserved borrower types. Since we condition on a rich set of character-
istics, the different percentiles of the distribution can be interpreted as the unobserved search and
2negotiation ability of consumers. Low quantiles are borrowers who received a relatively big dis-
count (e.g. searchers), while high quantiles are borrowers paying high rates (e.g. non-searchers).
We ﬁnd that losing a lender option raised interest rates between 7 and 9 bps for consumers in the
lower and middle percentiles of the conditional transaction rate distribution, but is statistically
indistinguishable from zero in the top 35%. This result conﬁrms that only consumers gathering
multiple quotes are adversely affected by the merger. In contrast, consumers who are unable or
unwilling to negotiate pay a price that is strictly a function of their willingness to pay and/or the
common posted interest rate, which is not directly affected by the loss of a lending option. This
leads us to conclude that market power in mortgage markets originates in large part from the
presence of heterogeneous search costs and negotiation abilities.
These results have important policy implications. On the one hand, our analysis suggests that,
from the point of view of consumers who search, the market is fairly competitive. Although rates
increase, the extra interest cost for the average searcher caused by the merger is relative small,
especially considering the fact that our analysis focuses exclusively on local markets with a small
number of lenders (i.e. between ﬁve and eight). On the other hand, we also ﬁnd that the rates paid
by borrowers who do not search are not affected by the degree of competition between lenders:
access to fewer lender options does not lead to higher rates for these borrowers. Therefore, policies
designed to increase competition, or at least to prevent increases in concentration, such as restric-
tions on merger activity or bank bailouts, may not be effective for those consumers unwilling to
search or unable to negotiate. Instead, policies aimed at improving ﬁnancial literacy, or reducing
the ability of lenders to price discriminate between consumers based on negotiation ability are
more likely to be effective at reducing interest rates for these consumers. Given the large amount
of residual price dispersion that we document in this market, it is likely that these policies would
be effective at increasing consumer welfare.
We are connected to two important literatures. First, there is an extensive literature analyzing
bank mergers, particularly in the U.S. This stems largely from the increased number of mergers
following the Riegle Neal Act of 1994. Berger et al. (1999) provide a detailed discussion. Despite
this attention, a lack of consumer-level data has made it difﬁcult to analyze the effect on transac-
tion prices, and therefore most studies have focused on the impact of mergers on deposit services
(fees and rates). For instance Prager and Hannan (1998) ﬁnd that bank mergers in the U.S. led to
a decrease in deposit rates. Focarelli and Panetta (2003) use Italian deposit data and ﬁnd a similar
rate decrease in the short-run, but determine that in the long-run the gains in efﬁciency due to
the merger resulted in rate increases. Closest to our approach, Sapienza (2002) uses Italian data
and ﬁnds that interest rates on business loans increased or decreased after a merger depending on
market shares. She ﬁnds that mergers leading to high levels of concentration were associated with
the highest rate hikes. Consistent with our results, she also provides evidence that borrowers with
either many or very few outside options are relatively unaffected by changes in market power,
whereas borrowers with average outside options are the most affected. Panetta, Schivardi, and
Shum (2009) use the same data as Sapienza and ﬁnd that mergers lead to a better correspondence
3between interest rates and risk. That is, risky borrowers pay a higher rate post merger while less
risky borrowers pay less.
Second, this paper is related to the literature on information frictions in ﬁnancial markets. Most
of this literature has focused on risk and problems of adverse selection (see for instance Adams,
Einav, and Levin (2009)). Less attention has been paid to information frictions stemming from
search costs as in the mortgage market. Hortac ¸su and Syverson (2004) study the role that search
frictions play in generating the large amount of dispersion in the fees that investors pay in the
mutual fund industry.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the Canadian mortgage markets, focus-
ingonmarketstructure, mortgageinsuranceandcontracttype, pricing, negotiation, andshopping
habits. Section 3 presents the data. Section 4 introduces a simple bargaining model to illustrate the
theoretical effects of mergers on negotiated prices. Section 5 discusses our identiﬁcation strategy,
and Section 6 presents the results. Section 7 concludes. We relegate some tables to the Appendix.
2. THE CANADIAN MORTGAGE MARKET
2.1. Market structure and mergers. The Canadian mortgage market is currently dominated by
six national banks (Bank of Montreal, Bank of Nova Scotia, Banque Nationale, Canadian Impe-
rial Bank of Commerce, Royal Bank Financial Group, and TD Bank Financial Group), a regional
cooperative network (Desjardins in Quebec), and a provincially owned deposit-taking institution
(Alberta’s ATB Financial). Collectively, they control 90 per cent of assets in the banking industry
and are called the “Big 8.”
The market was not always this concentrated. Until the early 1990s the Canadian residential-
mortgage market also featured a large number of trust companies. Trusts make mortgage loans,
funding them by issuing guaranteed investment certiﬁcates and accepting deposits. At the time
the main difference between trusts and banks was that trusts were more lightly regulated with
regards to reserve requirements. In particular, trusts did not have to hold reserves against mort-
gages, while chartered banks did. This provided trusts with a competitive advantage in the mort-
gage market due to lower cost of funding. Cross-ownership between the two types of institutions
was not permitted until the 1992 revisions to the Bank Act. Following these revisions banks and
trusts were granted almost identical powers, making them undifferentiated products from the
point of view of consumers.
3
As a result of the Bank Act revisions and a series of bad residential and commercial loans that
created solvency and liquidity issues for the trusts in the 1980s, Canadian chartered banks ac-
quired the majority of trust companies over the course of the following decade. The merger wave
led to the six largest banks controlling approximately 80 per cent of the mortgage market – almost
double their 1980s market share. These mergers all resulted in signiﬁcant expansion of the merged
3There were still differences in ownership structure (trust companies could be closely held - and commercial ownership
of trusts became common, while banks had to be widely held to prevent ownership concentration) as well as in su-
pervisory authority (banks are federally regulated whereas trust companies can be federally or provincially regulated),
but these differences are unlikely to affect consumer demand. In 1992 trusts were given full consumer lending powers,
and banks were permitted to offer in-house wealth management advice (ﬁduciary services).
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FIGURE 1. Evolution of the market share of ﬁnancial institutions among new in-
sured mortgage contracts (smoothed)
entity’s branch network since in each case the Canadian Competition Bureau required little or no
forced divestiture of branches. Figure 1 presents the evolution of the mortgage-market share of
the main lending groups – The Big 8, Trusts, Credit Unions and other banks. Today, there are still
many trusts operating in Canada, but they are small and their inﬂuence on the mortgage market
is much less than it was prior to 2000.
The major trust acquisitions were: Canada Trust & Toronto-Dominion (2000), National Trust &
Scotia Bank (1997), Montreal Trust & Scotia Bank (1994), Royal Trust & Royal Bank (1993), and
Central Guaranty Trust & Toronto-Dominion (1993). A more detailed discussion of the major
Canadian bank mergers is presented in the Appendix. Our empirical analysis focuses on one of
these major acquisitions.
2.2. Mortgage contracts and mortgage insurance. There are two types of mortgage contracts in
Canada – conventional mortgages which are uninsured since they have a low loan-to-value ratio,
and high loan-to-value mortgages, which require insurance (for the lifetime of the mortgage).
Today, approximately 80% of newly issued mortgages fall in the latter category. The primary
insurer is the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC), a crown corporation with an
explicit backstop from the federal government.4 Our analysis focuses on insured mortgages.
4There are a number of private insurers as well, the only one in existence during our sample was Genworth Financial,
which also has an explicit government of Canada guarantee, albeit for 90 per cent. CMHC’s market share during our
sample averages around 80 per cent.
5All insurers use the same strict guidelines for insuring mortgages.5 First, borrowers with less
than 25% equity must purchase insurance.6 Second, borrowers with monthly gross debt payments
that are more than 32% of gross income or a total debt service ratio of 40% will almost certainly be
rejected.7 CMHC charges the lenders an insurance premium, ranging from 1.75 to 3.75 per cent of
the value of the loan – lenders pass this premium onto borrowers. Insurance qualiﬁcations (and
premiums) are common across lenders and based on the posted rate. Borrowers qualifying at one
bank, therefore, know that they can qualify at other institutions, given that the lender is protected
in case of default.
During our sample period, nearly all mortgage contracts were ﬁxed rate, among which over
85 per cent had a 5 year term (the second most common term is 36 months). A 5 year ﬁxed-rate
mortgage contract must be renegotiated every ﬁve years, which in effect acts like an adjustable
rate mortgage with a ﬁxed time-frame to renegotiate. This has been the standard contract offered
by Canadian banks since the late 1960’s. Most contracts also had 25 year amortization periods.
2.3. Pricing and negotiation. The large Canadian banks operate nationally and post prices that
are common across the country on a weekly basis in both national and local newspapers, as well
as online. There is little dispersion in posted prices, especially at the big banks: the coefﬁcient of
variation on posted rates for the Big six is close to zero.
In contrast there is a signiﬁcant amount of dispersion in transaction rates. In Allen et al. (2011)
we document that the coefﬁcient of variation in margins between 1999 and 2004, for example was
was 60%. Approximately 10% of borrowers pay the posted rate. The remainder receive a discount
below the posted price. This comes about because borrowers can search for and negotiate bet-
ter rates. One option for borrowers is to visit local branches and negotiate directly with branch
managers who have the authority to offer borrowers discounts below the posted price under gen-
eral guidelines from headquarters. Local branch managers compete against rival banks, but not
against other branches of the same bank. Survey evidence from the Canadian Association of Ac-
credited Mortgage Professionals reports that about 55% of new home buyers (new home buyers
are deﬁned as individuals who get a new mortgage as opposed to homeowners who reﬁnance
or renew an existing mortgage) visit multiple lenders when shopping for a mortgage, but the
remainder visit only one.8
Alternativelyborrowerscanhirebrokerstosearchforthebestratesontheirbehalf. Unlikeinthe
United States, brokers in Canada have ﬁduciary duties. Brokers are compensated by lenders, but
“hired”byborrowerstogatherthebestquotesfrommultiplelenders. Detailedsurveyevidenceby
Taddingstone in 2005 (MortgageBrokerReport@taddingstone.com) found that brokers on average
contact 5.9 lenders for their clients, suggesting they do, in fact, assist in gathering multiple quotes.
5The reference parameters are set by the Federal Government. See Traclet (2005) for more details.
6This is true during our sample. Today borrowers with less than 20% equity must purchase insurance.
7Gross debt service is deﬁned as principal and interest payments on the home, property taxes, heating costs, annual
site lease in case of leasehold, and 50 per cent of condominium fees. Total debt service is deﬁned as all payments for
housing and other debt.
8In the U.S., LendingTree reports that 39% of new home buyers gather only one quote. See also Lee and Hogarth (2000).
6TABLE 1. Distribution of ﬁnancial services between main and secondary institutions
Account Main FI Second FI All other FI
Mortgage (all) 67.4% 10.9% 21.7%a
Mortgage (no broker) 70.3% 10.8% 18.9%
Mortgage (broker) 37.3% 30.6% 32.1%
Loan 55.8% 9.6% 34.6%
Credit card 77.9% 20.7% 1.4%
GIC or term deposit 72.8% 15.8% 11.4%
Bonds, t-bills, GI’s 45.3% 7.8% 46.9%
Mutual funds 38.8% 7.2% 54.0%
Source: Canadian Finance Monitor survey conducted by Ipsos-Reid, between 1999 and
2007.
2.4. One-stop shopping. The evolution of the banking system following the 1992 Bank Act revi-
sions led many Canadian households to treat their primary bank as a “one-stop shop”, where they
purchase the majority of their ﬁnancial services. From Table 1 we see that 67 per cent of Canadian
households have their mortgage at the same ﬁnancial institution as their main checking account.
In addition, 55 per cent of household loans, 78 per cent of credit cards, 73 per cent of term deposits,
45 per cent of bonds/guaranteed investments and 39 per cent of mutual funds are held at the same
ﬁnancial institution as the households main checking account.
3. DATA
3.1. Mortgage-contract data. Our data set is a sample of insured mortgage contracts obtained
directly from CMHC.9 We obtained a 10 % random sample of new mortgage contracts issued
between 1992 and 2004, sampled by Census Metropolitan Area (CMA).10 We further restrict the
sample to contracts signed within a year of the merger. This is in part for convenience, since our
branchdataareannual. Inaddition, weknowthatthemergedentitydidnotstartclosingduplicate
branches until approximately a year after the ofﬁcial merger date. Our analysis therefore focuses
on the short-run impact of the merger, holding ﬁxed the distribution of branches.
We have access to 20 household/mortgage characteristics, including all of the ﬁnancial charac-
teristics of the contract (i.e. rate, loan size, house price, debt-ratio, risk-type), the lender identity
(for the 12 largest lenders), and some demographic characteristics (e.g. income, prior relationship
with the bank, residential status, dwelling type).11 In addition, we observe the location of the
purchased house up to the forward sortation area (FSA). This unit of aggregation corresponds to
about 4 to 6 census-tracts in urban areas (or between 10,000 and 40,000 households), or one small
town in more rural areas. The median population size per FSA is about 16,000.12
9Although we also have access to Genworth contracts, which we use in Allen et al. (2011) to highlight the importance
of discounting in the Canadian mortgage market, the Genworth data does not include contracts from Trust companies,
and therefore is of limited use for our merger analysis.
10Breslaw et al. (1996) have previously used this data to study mortgage term and amortization choice in the 1980s.
11Table 9 in the Appendix lists all of the variables included in data-set.
12The FSA is the ﬁrst half of a postal code. There are over 1,300 FSA’s in Canada, and over 850,000 postal codes.
7TABLE 2. Summary statistics on mortgage contracts and household characteristics
VARIABLES Mean Std-dev. P25 P50 P75
Transaction rate (pi) 7.17 0.52 6.83 7.06 7.56
Monthly payment 950.08 401.50 636.83 883.99 1198.11
Income (x 1000$) 66.69 25.99 48.02 62.84 80.17
Loan (x 1000$) 131.00 56.28 87.11 121.79 166.55
Loan-to-value 0.91 0.04 0.90 0.93 0.95





The sample size is equal to 17,074. It includes a random sample of homogenous term and
amortization contracts insured by CMHC within one year of the merger. Transaction rate
is expressed in difference from weekly average (scaled up by the unconditional average).
Renters and parents correspond to new home buyers (the omitted category is home own-
ers). Switcher is an indicator variable equal to one if consumers have no prior experience
with the chosen ﬁnancial institution. The sample is restricted to households with ﬁve to
eight lenders located within ﬁve kilometers of their FSA centroid (see section 2.1 for more
details).
During our sample period, some of these characteristics were missing for a fraction of contracts
(mostly risk, residential status, and ﬁnancial intermediary). We include these observations in the
regression analysis, but add a series of interaction terms with group dummy variables to control
forthefactthatthenumberofmissingvalueswasdecreasingovertimeandunequalacrosslenders
(see footnote 20).
We restrict our sample to newly issued mortgages, excluding home-owners that are either re-
ﬁnancing or renewing their mortgage contract. We also focus on contracts with homogenous
lengths and terms. In particular, our analysis focuses on contracts with a 25 years amortization
period, and 5 year ﬁxed-rate term.13
Table 2 describes the key variables that we use in our analysis. The key outcome variable is
the transaction interest rate paid by consumers. In most of our regression analysis, we study the
impact of the merger on the relative interest rate paid by consumers, by subtracting the average
transaction rate among contracts signed during the same week.14 In Table 2 we scale up this vari-
able by adding the unconditional average rate between 1991 and 2004 (i.e. 7.15%). Interestingly,
the week-to-week variation corresponds to 48% of the total variance in interest rates: the standard-
deviation goes from 0.74 to 0.52 when we express rates in deviation from their weekly average.
13This sample selection choice, however, could bias our estimates if banks reacted to the merger by offering more
aggressive discounts on short terms contracts, or variable interest rates. In results not reported here we formally test
the null hypothesis of exogenous contract choice with respect the merger, and fail to ﬁnd evidence of endogenous
selection.
14The results are unchanged if we use transaction rates in levels and include week ﬁxed effects in our analysis. We
chose to use interest rate deviations in order to compare results across different estimation methods which cannot
easily accommodate week ﬁxed effects.
8Therefore, slightly more than half of the total interest rate variation in our data is coming from
cross-sectional dispersion. In comparison the average margin, measured relative to the 5-year
government bond rate, is equal to 1.08 during our sample period. This magnitude of dispersion is
large compared to other ﬁnancial markets, considering the homogeneity of the contract terms. For
instance, Hortac ¸su and Syverson (2004) show that the cross-sectional standard-deviation among
mutual-fund transaction fees was equal to 60 bps in 2001. Mutual-funds are much more heteroge-
neous than the 5-year ﬁxed rates mortgage contracts that we study.
The average home owner in our data earns $67,000, and contracted a loan of $131,000. A large
fraction (40%) of households are constrained by the minimum down-payment requirement of 5%
of the house price. Also, most consumers represent relatively low default risks to the CMHC, since
65% of borrowers have credit scores greater than 600. This is partly due to the fact that households
are constrained to have a total debt service ratio below 40%.
In our sample 25% of contracts were negotiated through a broker, and 34% of consumers switch
to a ﬁnancial institution with whom they did not have any prior experience. Notice that the vast
majority of broker transactions are labeled “switchers” (i.e. 74%), since brokers most commonly
deal with smaller institutions (i.e. trust or insurance companies). This is because some of the major
banks refuse, sometimes explicitly, to deal with brokers.15 Since we do not observe the number
of quotes each consumer receives we use these two variables to proxy for the search behavior of
consumers.
3.2. Lender location data. We have compiled branch-location information for all ﬁnancial institu-
tions in Canada from the Financial Services Canada directory produced by Micromedia ProQuest.
This data-set provides detailed information at the local-market level and so allows us to identify
which local markets were affected by the merger, and to construct concentration measures. For
more details on the evolution of branch networks in Canada see Allen, Clark, and Houde (2008).
4. THEORY
The impact of a merger on transaction rates can be understood through the lens of a simple
Nash bargaining model in which lender j negotiates with borrower i over an interest rate pij.
Assume for simplicity that lenders have a symmetric cost ci of lending to consumer i, then lender
j earns a proﬁt equal to ij = pij   ci from the transaction, and zero otherwise.
Borrower i’s surplus from dealing with lender j is given by vij = j   pij, where j can be
thought of as the “quality” of the complementary services offered by j. The bargaining outcome
depends on the consumer’s outside option, denoted by vi0 = 0   p0
i. This value depends on
market structure, on consumers’ negotiation ability, and on their utility of owning a house relative
to renting.
We assume that consumers are differentiated in their ability to negotiate a discount on their
mortgage, which we denote by ui. For instance, ui can be thought of as the expected number
15Brokers in Canada are compensated by lenders an amount equal to 1-1.3 per cent the value of the mortgage. Unlike
in the United States, mortgage brokers are not compensated as a function of the interest rate. Furthermore, mortgage
brokers have ﬁduciary duties with respect to the borrower.
9of quotes that a consumer would gather if he/she searched. Rather than explicitly modeling the
search process, we assume that both parties expect that a consumer of type ui will be able to obtain
a price quote equal to p0
i = ci + (ui) if negotiations fail with bank j; where (ui) is the markup
obtained by getting quotes from other banks.16 Further, we assume that the markup function
is weakly decreasing in ui, and converges to a constant   for consumers with low bargaining
abilities. For these consumers, it is natural to expect that the transaction price is constrained by an
upper bound given by the minimum of the common posted interest rate, and their willingness to
pay for owning a house.17
Assumption 1. The markup function for a consumer of type ui satisﬁes the two properties:
@(ui)
@ui




ij = ci +
1
2




This equation is the basis of our empirical analysis. In what follows we formulate a series of
predictions as to the impact of losing a lender option on the Nash-Bargaining price.
The ﬁrst-order effect of losing a lender option is to reduce the ability of consumers to obtain
largerdiscountsbygatheringmultiplequotes. Ifthemergeronlyinducesamarketpowerincrease,
it can be thought of as changing the shape of the markup function from () to M(). The average
treatment effect can thus be written as:








This leads to our ﬁrst prediction: If the number of lenders in a consumer’s choice-set affects the
discount he/she is able to extract, the average treatment effect should be positive.
We are also interested in testing whether the merger effect varies across borrowers. Speciﬁcally,
if (ui) is a constant for consumers with poor negotiation abilities or high search costs, the merger
should lead to differential price increases for consumers with high and low ui’s.18 In particular,
the treatment effect of the merger should be equal to zero for all consumers with ui <  u:
(3) i = M(ui)   (ui) =       = 0:
This is our second prediction: Assuming that borrowers have heterogeneous search and bargain-
ing abilities, those with poor negotiation abilities or high search costs will not be affected by the
merger.
16See Bester (1993) and Desai and Purohit (2004) for models of price negotiation in which (ui) is an endogenous
outcome.
17In principle   should be consumer speciﬁc. We use this notation to highlight the fact that these consumers obtain a
discount that is independent of market structure, and constant across lenders.
18Note that a similar effect could arise for consumers with very high ui’s since both before and after the merger they
should be able to drive the markup to (or close to) zero.
10Finally, we also consider two indirect effects of the merger. First, the merger can increase the
willingness to pay of consumers for the new entity: AB > maxfA;Bg, where A is the Bank
and B is the trust and AB is the merged entity. If this is the case, the average treatment effect
of the merger will be different for AB consumers (direct effect) and competing banks’ consumers
(indirect effect). For instance if j =  for all j and AB > :19
AB = E [pijjM = 1;ji = A;B]   E [pijjM = 0;ji = A;B] =
1
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= E [pijjM = 1;ji 6= A;B]   E [pijjM = 0;ji 6= A;B] = Other:
This yields our third prediction: If the merger increases the willingness to pay of consumers for
the new entity, then the direct effect of the merger is larger than the indirect effect.
Note from the perspective of borrowers transacting with a competing lender, the effect of the
merger is to improve the quality of their outside option and therefore put downward pressure on
the rate quote from their lenders.
A similar asymmetry between lenders can be caused by a sorting effect: the distribution of
consumer types within A or B pre-merger is different than within AB post-merger. For instance,
it is possible that consumers dealing with trust companies are more price sensitive (i.e. higher
ui) than consumers dealing with national banks. Unless we observe ui, we cannot distinguish
between a quality improvement and a change in the mix of consumer types across lenders. In
the empirical analysis, we use proxy variables for ui to empirically distinguish between these two
sources for heterogeneous treatment effects. For instance, we estimate the effect of the merger on
the probability of using a broker, or of remaining loyal to the home bank.
A ﬁnal consequence of the merger that would affect lenders symmetrically is an increase in the
search effort of consumers. This can be thought of as an increase in the number of quotes that a
consumer of type ui is expected to gather, or equivalently, as a rightward shift in the distribution
of ui:
(4) Pr(ui < xjM = 1)  Pr(ui < xjM = 0):
This is our ﬁnal prediction: The merger increases the search effort of consumers.
This sorting effect of the merger attenuates the market power increase, and therefore reduces the
magnitude of the average treatment effect  .
5. ESTIMATION AND IDENTIFICATION STRATEGY
5.1. Estimation strategy. Our analysis focuses on one of the major acquisitions that took place
in Canada between the mid 1990s and early 2000s. For conﬁdentiality reasons we label the two
institutions A and B. Firm A is a national bank, and therefore present in nearly all local markets
in Canada prior to the merger. Firm B, on the other hand, is smaller, and prior to the merger
19A similar asymmetry can be interpreted as efﬁciency gains resulting from the merger. In the current setting, quality
improvements and cost reductions are isomorphic.
11less than 2 per cent of ﬁrm B’s observed contracts were in markets where A was not one of B’s
competitors.
Our empirical strategy relies on the idea that when two banks merge, the pre-merger location
of branches creates discrete changes in the structure of local markets, and therefore the choice-set
of consumers. In particular, when two neighboring branches merge because of a national acqui-
sition/merger, local competition is immediately reduced since local branch administrators part
of the same network stop competing. Importantly, since bank mergers are negotiated nationally,
these changes can be viewed as exogenous relative to local market conditions, at least in the short
run.
In order to deﬁne a set of consumers affected by the merger, we assume that consumers shop for
mortgages in a neighborhood around the house they purchase. This deﬁnes their choice set. In our
context, although we observe each household only once, we observe most neighborhoods, deﬁned
by postal codes, before and after the merger. However, rather than study the effect of the merger
at the postal-code level, we study its effect at the contract level. We therefore index everything by
i where i captures three things: (i) the individual borrower (or household), (ii) the time period of
the contract (before or after the merger), and (iii) the location of the purchased house.
Treated consumers are therefore deﬁned as purchasing a house in a neighborhood in which
both A and B were present prior to the merger, and consumers located in neighborhoods with
only A or B, or none are part of the control group. We let Gi denote the treatment group indicator.
Similarly, Ti is a period indicator variable equal to one for contracts signed after the merger, and
Mi = Ti  Gi is the treatment (merger) indicator variable.
Since we observe a panel of contracts before and after the mergers, we can estimate the effect of
the merger on transaction rates using a standard difference-in-difference estimator:
(5) pi = Mi + Ti + Gi + 0Zi + ui;
where  measures the average effect of the merger on transaction interest rates (i.e.   in equation
1), and Zi is a vector of control variables describing the ﬁnancial and demographic characteristics
of the contract (i.e. including month and province indicator variables). It includes variables that
we believe are predetermined at the negotiation stage (i.e. ﬁnancial, market, and demographic
characteristics), and excludes variables that are jointly determined through a negotiation process
(i.e. broker transactions, and relationship duration indicator). We also include in Zi time-varying
variables measuring the distribution and number of branches among competing networks to ac-
count for changes in the number retail branches over the period.20
20The exact set of control variables are: income, loan size, loan to income ratio, other debts, debts to income ratio,
loan-to-value categorical variables, credit score categories (4), residential status category (4), FSA demographic char-
acteristics (i.e. income, house value, fraction of renters, fraction with university degree, fraction of inter-provincial
migration, age), number of lenders (other than A or B), and average number of branch per lender (other than A or B).
To control for the non-random nature of missing household characteristics we interact a missing value dummy with:
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FIGURE 2. Distribution shortest distances between homes and banks
To estimate heterogenous treatment effects, such as the direct and indirect effect described
above, we allow  to be a linear function of Xi:
(6) pi = Mi + XMi  Xi + Ti + Gi + XTi  Xi + XGi  Xi + 0Zi + ui;
and  + XXi measures the average treatment effect conditional on Xi. Both parameters can
be estimated by OLS. We also estimate equation 5 using other outcome variables to measure the
sorting effects of the merger (i.e. choice of bank, broker, and switching probability).
Below we discuss three issues related to estimation of the treatment effect of the merger: (i) the
deﬁnition of a neighborhood size, (ii) the identiﬁcation assumptions, and (iii) the estimation of the
distribution of the treatment effects.
5.2. Choice-set boundaries. We assume that consumers shop for mortgages in a neighborhood
of radius 5 KM around the center of the house they purchased.21 This assumption appears to
be reasonable in the case of mortgage contracts since consumers transact with an institution that
is on average located within 2 kilometers of the center of their forward sortation area.22 The
two histograms in Figure 2 show that the average distance to consumers’ chosen lenders is much
smaller than the average distance to other ﬁnancial institutions.
5.3. Identiﬁcation assumptions. Unlike other forms of program evaluation, retail mergers are
not endogenously chosen by local market participants. This does not mean that the treatment is
necessarily independent of unobserved transaction attributes ui, since the timing and location of
local mergers can be correlated with other aggregate variables affecting interest rates. The key
identifying assumption that allows us to interpret  (and X) as the causal effect of the merger,
is that conditional on Zi, differences between the treatment and control groups are the same on
21In section 6.4 we relax this assumption and evaluate the robustness of our results to the size of competing neighbor-
hoods.
22We deﬁne distance as the Euclidian distance between the center of each forward sortation area of the household and
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FIGURE 3. Distribution of the number lenders per local markets before the merger
average in different time periods (pre- and post-merger). That is, the merger is not confounded with
aggregate trends speciﬁc to the control or treatment groups. In the simple difference-in-difference
estimator, the control group observations are therefore used to linearly predict the evolution of
those aggregate variables, and construct the missing counter-factual outcome: E(pijTi = 1;Gi =
1;Mi = 0;Zi).
An often overlooked issue in the evaluation of mergers is the comparability of treatment and
control groups. For instance, Heckman et al. (1997) note that “failure to locate participants and
comparison group members in the same labor market is a major source of evaluation bias”, even
more so than selection bias caused by endogenous participation. Although controlling for observ-
able differences by including Zi in the regressions solves part of this problem, the linear speciﬁ-
cation imposes very strong restrictions when the two groups are not comparable. When treated
and control observations are too different, the linear speciﬁcation will fail to accurately predict the
evolution of rates in the treated markets absent of the merger.
In our context, the most important difference is that local markets with both A and B tend to
be larger and have more lenders. Figures 3a and 3b illustrate that the two groups overlap only in
medium-size markets with four to nine lenders. Less than 1% of control markets have more than
8 lenders, while less than 1% of treatment markets have fewer than 5.
Our main approach to deal with this issue is to restrict the sample to local markets with ﬁve to
eight lenders, and to estimate equation 5 by OLS. This restriction comes at the cost of weakening
the external validity of our estimates, since we can only measure the effect of a merger in markets
with a moderate level of competition. With this additional restriction, households with only one
or none of the two ﬁrms are under-represented (i.e. 37% versus 67%), but less so than in the full
sample (i.e. 10% versus 90%). The ﬁnal sample includes 17,074 observations over 427 different
locations (including 265 with both institutions).
Table 3 describes the structure of choice-sets, deﬁned as the 5 KM buffer around each observed
contract. The ﬁrst two columns illustrate the distribution of the number of lenders and branches
14TABLE 3. Summary statistics on consumer choice-sets prior to the merger
Full sample 5  N  8
A or B A & B A or B A & B
or none or none
Nb. Lenders 5.575 8.655 6.681 7.527
(2.14) (1.25) (1.14) (0.68)
Nb. Branches 17.742 62.988 23.087 28.031
(20.60) (70.68) (21.94) (18.45)
Branch HHI 1.538 1.674 1.621 1.622
(0.31) (0.32) (0.28) (0.25)
Share A 0.060 0.142 0.057 0.161
(0.09) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06)
Share B 0.008 0.098 0.010 0.117
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
 Branch HHI 0.187 0.213
(0.22) (0.25)
Each entry corresponds the sample average and standard-deviation (in parenthesis), cal-
culated using the observation weights from the mortgage contract data-set. Local markets
are deﬁned as 5 KM euclidian distance around each FSA centroid. Markets “A or B, or
none” do not have A and B together, and markets “A & B” have both merging parties.
in the full sample; including markets with more than 8 and less than 5 lenders. Excluding the non-
overlapping local markets leads to comparable neighborhoods: the average number of branches
and Herﬁndahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) are similar across the two groups, as is the number of
lenders pre-merger. The last three rows show that, absent of any other simultaneous change,
concentration would increase signiﬁcantly in markets with both A and B. Both institutions had
a large presence in A & B markets, with a cumulative average market share of 27%. The merger
alone therefore corresponds to an average increase of 0.213 points in the branch HHI.
Our second approach to deal with the comparability of treated and control neighborhoods is
to use the difference-in-difference matching estimator proposed by Heckman et al. (1997, 1998).
This estimator computes the counter-factual average interest rate changes in the treatment group,
using a weighted average of changes observed in the control group. The weights used for averag-
ing are estimated with a kernel, and observations that are “similar” to the corresponding treated
observations receive larger weights.
In our context, although we observe each household only once, we observe most neighbor-
hoods before and after the merger. We therefore use a kernel-based propensity score estimator,
and compare contracts according to the probability that their neighborhood was part of the treat-
ment group. To calculate the propensity score, we estimate a Logit model that controls for time-
invariant demographic characteristics and branch concentration of each neighborhood. Moreover,
we compare neighborhoods with the same number of lenders pre-merger. By construction this re-
stricts our analysis to markets with ﬁve to eight lenders.
15This leads to the following estimator of the average treatment effect on treated consumers:































where NG;T denotes the set of observations in group G = f0;1g (i.e. G = 1 for treatment group)
and period T = f0;1g (i.e. T = 1 after the merger), jNg;tj measures the number of observations
in (G;T), and !T(i;j) = Kb(i;j)=
P
j2N0;T Kb(i;j) is a weight measured with a kernel with band-
width b over the propensity score of observations i and j. Note that Kb(i;j) = 0 if i and j do not
face the same number of lenders per-merger. To ensure a common support in the propensity score
distribution across the two groups, we drop observations for which the propensity score kernel
density is below the 5% percentile of the positive density.23
5.4. Distributionoftreatmenteffect. Animportantcriticismofthestandarddifference-in-difference
model is that it imposes a strong functional form assumption: equation 5 assumes that transac-
tion interest rates are a linear and additive function of persistent group-level heterogeneity (i.e.
) and time-varying aggregate shocks (i.e. ). This criticism has been articulated by Athey and
Imbens (2006), among others, who propose an alternative non-parametric estimator for discrete
treatments that allows for heterogenous and non-linear effects.
To recast their model in our framework, we use the pricing equation from the Nash-Bargaining
model derived in section 4, and assume that the common lending cost and bank quality is ci +
1
2(j   0) = 0Zi. This leads to a semi-parametric pricing equation:
(8) pi = 0Zi + h(ui;T);
where, in the context of the Nash-bargaining model described above, h(ui;T) = 1
2(ui;T) and
T 2 f0;1g incorporates an aggregate time trend measuring for instance the diffusion of brokers
into the market, or aggregate business cycles.24
Recall that the merger affects the outside option of consumers by making it harder to negotiate
large discounts. The merger effect for consumer ui is thus equal to:
(9) (ui) = hM(ui;T)   d(ui;T);
where hM(u;T) measures the markup that consumer ui pays in period t with the merger. More-
over, if the market power increase impacts consumers with varying negotiation skills differen-
tially, we should expect a distribution of treatment effects: (ui) 6= (u0
i) if ui 6= u0
i.
In order to estimate the distribution of merger effects, we impose three assumptions discussed
in Athey and Imbens (2006).
Assumption 2. The markup function d(u;T) is strictly monotonic in ui, and constant across groups.
23To control for time-varying observed characteristics Zi, we implement the regression-adjusted estimator proposed
by Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997). We ﬁrst project rates on the contract characteristics, month ﬁxed effects, and
provincial ﬁxed effects using the control group observations. The results are mostly unchanged if we use an unadjusted
speciﬁcation. Standard-errors are calculated by bootstrapping.
24The vector Zi includes bank ﬁxed effects, which absorb permanent differences in the quality of each lender.
16Assumption 3. The distribution of types ui  HG(u) differs across groups G, but is constant over time.
Assumption 4. The support of ui in the treatment group overlaps with the support of ui in the control
group: U1  U0.
Under these assumptions, we can calculate the change in the function d() that would have oc-
curred over time without the merger. This transformation is implemented using the fact that the
change in the qth percentile of the control price distribution identiﬁes the change in the markup
function that is strictly due to time. Using this logic, and the fact that the empirical price dis-
tributions are invertible (under assumption 2), we can recover the counter-factual distribution of
prices, denoted ~ F1;1, in the treatment group for any price p in the common support:






where FG;T(p) is the CDF of prices in the sub-population (G;T). Intuitively, we obtain the counter-
factual distribution of prices by transforming the observed price distribution in period zero (i.e.
F1;0(p)) in a such a way that mimics the change in the price distribution observed in the control
group. From this transformation we can recover the average treatment effect on the treated:




















= ^ C; (11)
where ^ FG;T corresponds to the empirical CDF of prices in sample (G;T). We use a subscript C to
label this the “change-in-change” estimator.
Similarly, we can recover an estimate of the effect of the merger for each percentile of the distri-
bution:
(12) ^ C(q) = ^ F 1









Since we can normalize the scale of ui to be between zero and one, the previous expression mea-
sures the estimated effect of the merger on a consumer with negotiation ability ui = q.
In practice, we construct both estimators while controlling for covariates in the parametric form
suggested by equation 8, assuming that ui is independent of Zi. We follow the suggestion of
Athey and Imbens (2006) (pages 465-466), and construct the empirical price distributions using
the residuals of a regression of transaction interest rates on Zi. The standard-errors are obtained
by bootstrapping.25
6. RESULTS
6.1. Average treatment effects. In Table 4 we present OLS regression results of the average treat-
ment effect of the merger. The dependent variable is measured as the transaction rate minus the
weekly average rate across all markets. For most of our analysis we exclude local markets with
25See Huynh et al. (2011) for analysis of the bootstrap performance in this context.
17TABLE 4. Effect of the merger on transaction prices
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES
Merger 0.00991 0.0593a 0.154a -0.0482 0.0908a
(0.0159) (0.0202) (0.0482) (0.0616) (0.0228)
Merger X Indirect -0.117b
(0.0514)
Merger X A+B branch share 0.696b
(0.336)
Merger X 1(LTV=95) -0.0776b
(0.0340)
Constant 7.456a 7.451a 7.335a 7.434a 7.397a
(0.0753) (0.0848) (0.0583) (0.0886) (0.0846)
Observations 35,352 17,074 17,074 17,074 17,074
R-squared 0.059 0.059 0.060 0.060 0.076




c p-value < 0.1. The dependent variable is measured as the transaction rate minus the weekly aver-
age across all markets. The sample includes all contracts with non-missing characteristics one year before
and one year after the merger. Neighborhoods with fewer lenders than the 1st percentile in the treatment
group and more than 99th percentile in the control group are excluded (i.e. less than 5 or more than 8).
The control variables in columns (2)-(5) include: income, loan-size, loan/income interaction, loan-to-value
categories (3), credit score categories (5), residential status (i.e. parents or renter), census characteristics
(income, age, population, house-value), and bank, month and province dummies. Speciﬁcation (1) uses the
same controls as speciﬁcation (2), but is estimated on the full sample, including local markets with more
than eight or less than ﬁve lenders.
fewer than 5 and more than 8 lenders. As discussed in section 5.3, we do this in an effort to make
our control and treatment markets as similar as possible.
Restricting the sample to overlapping market structures turns out to be important, as illustrated
by the results in columns (1) and (2) of Table 4. In these speciﬁcations we present the aggregate
effect of the merger on rates. Column (1) is estimated on the full sample, including local markets
with less than 5 or more than eight lenders, while column (2) is estimated on the restricted sample.
Using the full sample we would conclude that the merger had no effect on rates. Once we restrict
the sample, we estimate that the merger led to an average interest rate increase in treated markets
of around 6 basis points (bps).
Note that an increase of 6 bps corresponds to 12% of the cross-sectional standard-deviation of
interest rates, or 5.5% increase in retail margins. Assuming a common loan size and holding it
ﬁxed at $100,000, we estimate that the merger led to a $4 increase in monthly payments which
translates into $240 over the ﬁve years of the contract. Overall this effect is small, and suggests
that the market is fairly competitive: the average consumer is able to extract a large share of
the transaction surplus through search and negotiation. It should be pointed out, however, that
randomness in choice sets of borrowers may introduce some amount of measurement error in
18the treatment variable that would bias downward the point estimate. In the robustness section
we consider different deﬁnitions for the choice set of consumers (different distance measures),
but this may not entirely solve the problem since, if a measurement error exists, it likely stems
from the fact that there is heterogeneity in the choice set for individual borrowers. For instance 5
kms may be appropriate for urban borrowers, but rural borrowers may consider lenders that are
located much further away.
Columns (3) to (5) show that the effect of the merger is heterogeneous across consumers and
markets. Column (3) decomposes the aggregate merger effect into a direct effect and an indirect
effect. Consumers transacting with the merged entity experience the largest price increase: over 15
bps, compared to less than 4 bps for consumers selecting a competing institution. Again suppos-
ing a loan size of $100,000, this works out to an increase of $750 at the merged entity and just $180
at competing institutions. In column (4) we study how the effect depends on the market share
of the merged entity’s. We ﬁnd that the average treatment effect is an increasing function of the
combined number of branches of the two institutions. Speciﬁcally, rates increased by almost 30
basis points in markets where the merged entity controlled 45% of the branches (95th percentile).
Over ﬁve years this works out to almost $1300 in increased payments. These results are consistent
with the idea that the merger raised the value of transacting with the merged entity, either because
it raises the value of the complementary services offered by the bank, or reduces the shopping cost
for consumers.
The last speciﬁcation in column (5) suggests that less ﬁnancially constrained buyers experience
larger rate increases as a result of the merger. We attribute this to differences in the bargaining
abilities of ﬁnancially constrained and unconstrained consumers. In general, consumers able to
negotiate larger discounts are the most likely to be affected by the merger, since it reduces their
ability to gather multiple competing quotes. This result suggests, therefore, that consumers with
more ﬂexibility to increase the down-payment beneﬁt the most from competition between lenders.
In contrast, ﬁnancially constrained buyers are less likely to shop around for multiple quotes, or
have fewer bargaining options. One possible reason for this is that these consumers perceive that
they cannot do any better by searching and in fact may even be rejected as clients (despite the fact
that mortgage insurance guidelines are constant across lenders).
In Table 5 we study the robustness of our main results to alternative estimation methods.
The ﬁrst column compares the aggregate effect of the merger estimated using the matching and
change-in-change estimators. Overall all three models yield similar conclusions. The matching es-
timator produces larger effects than the other two (i.e. 7.6 bps compare to 5.9 or 6.4), but all three
yield overlapping conﬁdence intervals. The results suggest that matching the sample based on a
common number of lenders range, as in Table 4, corrects for most, if not all, of the bias generated
by systematic differences across control and treatment groups.
In order to compare the heterogeneous treatment effects across methods, we estimate the model
under different sub-samples instead of estimating interaction terms as in Table 5. The matching es-
timator is less precise in general, and some of the estimates are not signiﬁcantly different from zero
19TABLE 5. Average treatment effect of the merger on transaction prices for different
estimators and sub-populations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ESTIMATORS Aggregate Direct Indirect LTV=95% LTV<95%
OLS DID 0:059a 0:128b 0:041c 0:017 0:088a
(0.020) (0.054) (0.022) (0.034) (0.024)
Matching DID 0:076a 0:115 0:053c 0:016 0:092b
(0.029) (0.073) (0.031) (0.046) (0.038)
Change-in-change 0:063a 0:133b 0:051a 0:018 0:104a
(0.018) (0.053) (0.019) (0.028) (0.024)
Nb. Observations 17,074 3,117 13,957 7,171 9,903
% Treated 0.67 0.76 0.64 0.66 0.67
Point estimates correspond to the average treatment effect on treated calculated using OLS (row 1), propen-
sity score matching (row 2), and the Change-in-Change estimator (row 3). OLS Standard errors are are
clustered at the local neighborhood level (i.e. FSA), and matching and CiC standard-errors were obtained
by bootstrapping with 1,000 replications. Signiﬁcance levels:
a p-value<0.01,
b p-value < 0.05,
c p-value
< 0.1. The dependent variable is measured as the transaction rate minus the weekly average across all
markets. The sample includes all contracts with non-missing characteristics one year before and after the
merger. Neighborhoods with fewer lenders than the 1st percentile in the treatment group and more than
the 99th percentile in the control group are excluded (i.e. less than 5 or more than 8). The control variables
include: income, loan-size, loan/income interaction, loan-to-value categories (3), credit score categories (5),
residential status (i.e. parents or renter), and bank, month and province dummies.
at standard levels as the sample shrinks.26 However, the point estimates are similar to those de-
rived from OLS and the change-in-change estimator, and we do not document any systematic bias
across sub-samples. Our conclusions therefore remain unchanged: A + B consumers were more
affected by the merger than competing institutions’ consumers, and ﬁnancially un-constrained
consumers experienced signiﬁcant price increases (between 8.8 and 10.4 bps).
6.2. Sorting effects of the merger. Part of the heterogeneity in price effects of the merger is as-
sociated with the endogenous sorting of consumers. We are interested in distinguishing between
two effects. First, the merger can increase the search effort of consumers, which would attenuate
the market power effect of the merger. Second, the merger can affect the mix of consumer types
that each lender is serving post-merger.
To study these effects, we consider the impact of the merger on the probability of choosing one
of the merging lenders, to use a broker, or to switch institution.27 The results are presented in Table
6. In column (1) we restrict attention to the probability of choosing Bank A. We ﬁnd that A’s share
increases by 2.5%, as would be expected since it has absorbed B following the merger. However,
their combined share decreased by 1.2% (see column (2)). This decrease is small however, and is
26Our matching estimator requires a large sample since we compare contracts within the same market structure cate-
gory, which sometimes reduces the number of comparable observations to a very small number.
27We have also tested for the presence of merger effects on other ﬁnancial characteristics, but failed to ﬁnd any statisti-
cally signiﬁcant effects. These additional results are available upon request.
20TABLE 6. Sorting and Search-intensity effects of the merger
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES 1(Bank=A) 1(Bank=A or B) Broker Switcher
Aggregate effect:
Merger 0.0254b -0.0133 0.0570a 0.0558b
(0.0124) (0.0128) (0.0190) (0.0217)
Disaggregate effect:
Merger X Direct -0.147a 0.0420c
(0.0329) (0.0220)
Merger X Indirect 0.0926a 0.0405c
(0.0226) (0.0241)
Observations 17,074 17,074 12,181 12,160




c p-value < 0.1. The sample includes all contracts with non-missing characteristics one year before
and after the merger. Neighborhoods with fewer lenders than the 1% percentile in the treatment group and
more than 99% percentile in the control group are excluded (i.e. less than 5 or more than 8). The control
variables include: bank, month and province dummies.
not statistically different from zero. This is despite the fact that transaction rates increased more
amongA+B consumers, thanamongcompetinglenders. Thisisconsistentwithourinterpretation
that the quality of the merged entity improved (its branch network and service range expanded).
A complementary interpretation is that the merged entity began serving a different mix of con-
sumers after the merger. Indeed, part of the direct price increase that we document is due to the
fact that prior to the merger Trust B consumers were more likely to obtain large discounts (con-
ditional on their Zs, i.e., observable characteristics).28 These price sensitive types are more likely
to transact with competing institutions post-merger, which would lead to an asymmetric price
change. Since the aggregate market share of the new entity did not change signiﬁcantly, these
results suggest that Bank A + B managed to attract new types of consumers to compensate; most
likely a larger fraction of consumers with a high valuation for the range of services or the network
size of their mortgage lender.
The results in columns (3) and (4) conﬁrm in part this interpretation. First, both the merged en-
tity and competing banks are signiﬁcantly more likely to receive new consumers (i.e. consumers
with no prior experience with their mortgage lender). Second, the merged entity is signiﬁcantly
less likely to transact with brokers, which is consistent with the idea that price sensitive con-
sumers have been switching away from the merged entity. In comparison, competing institutions
increased their share of broker transactions by 9%. In other words, following the merger borrow-
ers that engage in search by employing a broker are less likely to deal with the merged entity. This
could either be because the merged entity is not offering competitive rates to brokers, or because
its more dominant position in the market allows it to refuse to deal with brokers altogether.29
28Excluding B consumers from the sample reduces the direct effect in column (3) of Table 4 to 9 bps.
29At least one national bank has at times explicitly refused to deal with brokers.
21Moreover, in the aggregate sample (i.e. ﬁrst row), the probability of switching institutions or
using a broker increased by nearly 6%. This offers indirect support for our prediction that con-
sumers are more likely to search aggressively for quotes after the merger; either through a broker
or individually. While we do not observe the number of quotes that consumers receive, it is very
likely that most consumers start their search process by obtaining a quote from their home institu-
tion. Indeed according to a 2009 survey by the CAAMP, 80% of new home buyers shopped at their
home institutions. Therefore, the increase in the switching probability suggests that consumers are
more likely to gather multiple quotes because of the merger. More intense search on the part of
borrowers may explain in part why the average treatment effect is relatively small.
6.3. Distribution of treatment effect. Finally, we analyze the distribution of treatment effects
across consumers’ unobserved types. As discussed in Section 5.4, since we condition on a rich
set of characteristics, the percentiles of the distribution can be interpreted as the unobserved ne-
gotiation ability of consumers. Low quantiles are borrowers who received a relatively big discount
(e.g. searchers), while high quantiles are borrowers paying high rates (e.g. non-searchers). In this
context, our Nash bargaining model predicts that non-searchers should not be affected by the
merger since regardless of market structure they pay the upper bound of the markup function.
Figure 4 presents the distribution of the average treatment effect of the merger on transaction
prices using the change-in-change estimator. The aggregate effect becomes statistically indistin-
guishable from zero around the 70th percentile. Moreover, this gives a measure of the fraction of
consumers unable to haggle (i.e.  u in the theory section). Recall, that an independent survey of
consumers’ shopping habits revealed that 45% of consumers gather only one price quote when
shopping for their ﬁrst mortgage. Assuming that these consumers are at the top of the price dis-
tribution, our results suggest that around two thirds of consumers who accept the initial quote do
so because they are unwilling or unable to gather competing offers. This does not mean however
that these consumers pay the posted interest rate, since we estimate that only 15% of consumers
pay a rate within 10 bps of the posted price. Note also that we do not report results for this very
top part of the distribution. There are two reasons for this. First, there are many outliers in our
data in this part of the distribution. Second, the change-in-change estimator does not work here
since the empirical price distribution is not invertible at the posted price.
In Table 7 we present estimates of the treatment effects at different percentiles of the distri-
bution for several speciﬁcations in addition to the aggregate effect. Results are calculated using
the change-in-change estimator, and we report the treatment effect at six percentiles between 20
and 80. As in Figure 4 we ﬁnd that the effect of the merger ranges from around 5.5 to 9 bps for
borrowers in the 20th to 60th percentiles percentiles of the conditional transaction rate distribu-
tion, but is statistically indistinguishable from zero in the 80th percentile. In rows (2) through (5)
we decompose the aggregate result, and study again the effect of the merger on different sub-
populations. The results show that the same non-linear pattern that we observed in the aggregate
sample emerges for the direct and indirect effects of the merger which are measured to be around
20 and 6 bps respectively in the lower and middle percentiles, and lower in the top 30%. The de-
crease is more important in the competing banks subsample, and the direct effect is signiﬁcantly






























FIGURE 4. Distribution of the average treatment effect of the merger on transaction
prices
different from zero for all percentiles. Similarly, we measure the effect of the merger to be about 9
bps for less ﬁnancially constrained borrowers in the lower and middle percentiles, and zero in the
top part of the distribution.
It is important to note that these borrowers at the top of the distribution are not subject to higher
rates because they would not qualify for a loan at another bank given unobserved characteristics.
As mentioned in Section 2.2, borrowers qualifying at one bank, will also qualify at other institu-
tions given that the lender is protected in the case of default. It should also be noted that for these
results to be meaningful, the mix of consumer types must be constant across sub-groups. Speciﬁ-
cally, the distribution of search costs across sub-populations must be the same over time, which is
only the case if the merger does not lead borrowers with different search costs to sort themselves
endogenously into different sub-populations. Otherwise, Assumption 3 would be violated. This
restriction is mostly problematic when we look at the direct and indirect effect of the merger.
Our results are consistent with those of Sapienza (2002) who, in the context of business lending,
ﬁnds that those borrowers with either many or very few outside options for loans (as measured by
the number of other banking relationships they have) are unaffected by the merger. Although the
methods for identiﬁcation in her paper and ours are different, the interpretation of the economic
channel through which the results are derived is the same. Those borrowers that are either in a
strong or weak bargaining position are not affected when there is one less lender with whom to
negotiate.
23TABLE 7. Distribution of treatment effects of the merger on transaction prices
Distribution of treatment effects
GROUPS Nb. Obs. % Treated 20% 40% 50% 60% 80%
Aggregate 17,050 0.62 0:0574b 0:0646b 0:0755b 0:0861b 0:0270
Direct 3,112 0.73 0:1332b 0:1436b 0:1687b 0:2159b 0:1408b
Indirect 13,938 0.59 0:0436b 0:0491b 0:0574b 0:0620b  0:0420
LTV= 95% 7,164 0.61 0:0198 0:0253 0:0481 0:0709 0:0129
LTV< 0:95% 9,886 0.62 0:0949b 0:0906b 0:0923b 0:0925b 0:0546
The treatment effects at different percentiles of the distribution are calculated using the Change-in-Change
estimator (see text). The dependent variable is measured as the transaction rate minus the weekly average
across all markets. The sample includes all contracts with non-missing characteristics one year before and
after the merger. Neighborhoods with fewer lenders than the 1% percentile in the treatment group and
more than 99% percentile in the control group are excluded (i.e. less than 5 or more than 8). Conﬁdence
intervals were calculated by bootstrapping the sample 1,000 times. A b superscript is added to indicate
estimates that are signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 5% level.
6.4. Robustness. In this subsection we analyze the robustness of our results to different sample
assumptions and treatment-group deﬁnitions.
First, we re-estimate the linear difference-in-difference speciﬁcation assuming alternative dis-
tance rules to deﬁne the size of local markets. Recall that we assumed that consumers shop within
a 5 KM radius around the centroid of their FSA’s. Increasing this threshold tends to raise the
number of FSA’s directly affected by the merger, at the cost of including areas that are too large
(falsely treated). Using a smaller threshold reduces the number of treated neighborhoods, and
deﬁnes as control neighborhoods that are affected by the merger. Therefore, over-estimating or
under-estimating the size of shopping areas should bias our results towards zero.
TheresultspresentedinTable10oftheAppendixconﬁrmthisintuition. Theeffectofthemerger
is statistically different from zero for distance radii between three and six kilometers. Below and
above these levels the point estimates decrease towards to zero, and we cannot reject the null
hypothesis of no merger effect.
Next, we re-estimate the effect of the merger using different period windows. Throughout the
paper we used contracts signed at most one year before or after the ofﬁcial merger date. This
is a natural choice since the merged entity started closing duplicate branches about a year after
the merger. Our estimates therefore capture the effect of the merger holding ﬁxed (roughly) the
distribution of branches.
In Table 8 we show that the window choice does not affect our results, as long as we use a period
that does not exceed one year. In fact, the effect of the merger using a six month window is larger
than the one we get using the one year window (i.e. 8 versus 6 bps). Expanding our sample to
cover an eighteen-month period eliminates the merger effect. If nothing else happened during this
extended period, one could infer that the merger led to a short-run price increase, and a longer run
price decrease due to efﬁciency gains. It would be hazardous to make such a statement however,
24TABLE 8. Effect of the merger on transaction prices for alternative period windows
and merger dates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Period windows Merger dates
+/- 6 Months +/- 1 Year +/- 1.5 Year - 6 Months + 6 Months
Merger 0.0811a 0.0593a 0.0173 0.0403c -0.0491b
(0.0295) (0.0202) (0.0174) (0.0212) (0.0229)
Constant 7.359a 7.218a 7.187a 7.051a 7.152a
(0.128) (0.120) (0.0784) (0.0922) (0.0762)
Observations 8,319 17,074 25,591 17,909 16,934
R-squared 0.054 0.059 0.065 0.054 0.070
since other events occurred in this longer period, including the closure of duplicate branches, and
possibly other mergers.
In columns (4) and (5) we perform a falsiﬁcation exercise, in which we move the merger date
by six months and use a one year window as before. Our objective is to test for the presence of an
aggregate trend correlated with the merger date, that would be speciﬁc to consumers living in the
treated areas, and therefore bias our results. The results of this exercise are encouraging. Moving
the merger date six month earlier lowers the point estimate to 4 bps, and decreases the precision
(the effect is signiﬁcant at 10% level). Since the one year window includes six months after the
merger period, it make sense that the coefﬁcient would not go to zero completely.
Moreover, moving the merger date six months after changes the sign of the point estimate,
which is now negative and statistically signiﬁcant. This result is consistent with the estimate in
column (3), obtained with the 18 months window. It appears that something happened towards
theendoftheoneyearperiod, andduringthefollowingyear, suchthatinterestrateswentdownin
the treated markets relative to the control markets. If this event occurred during our main sample
period, it would bias our results against ﬁnding any price increase. We are therefore conﬁdent
that the documented price increase measures the change in market power caused by the merger.
7. CONCLUSION
In contrast to most of the literature studying the effects of horizontal mergers that focuses on
posted prices, we take advantage of transaction level data to document important heterogeneity in
the reactions of ﬁrms and consumers to a merger. Our empirical analysis exploits observed differ-
ences in the choice sets of consumers and their ﬁnancial characteristics to estimate heterogenous
treatment effects, and estimates the distribution of treatment effects across unobserved consumer
types.
We ﬁnd that the average effect of the merger under analysis is quite small, suggesting that the
average consumer is able to extract a large share of the transaction surplus through search and
negotiation even when there is one fewer lending option. However, this ﬁnding masks important
25heterogeneity. Some borrowers pay signiﬁcantly higher rates following the merger, while oth-
ers are barely affected. Although in some cases the higher rates may be associated with higher
market power resulting from the decrease in the number of lender options, many of those pay-
ing higher rates are contracting with the merged entity and may be beneﬁting from the improved
level of services offered. Even more importantly, the evidence we present suggests that much of
the heterogeneity in rates can be explained by differences in search costs and negotiation ability.
Borrowers at the top of the price distribution, those with very high search costs/bargaining abili-
ties, are not affected by the merger, while those lower in the price distribution are. Therefore our
results imply that lender competition appears to have no impact on rates in the top part of the
price distribution.
These results have important implications for the design of mortgage-market policies. If the
objective is to support vulnerable borrowers (those paying the highest rates), policies designed
to increase competition, or to prevent increases in concentration, such as restrictions on merger
activity or prevention of bank failure may be ineffectual. Instead, what would be required would
be policies designed to help borrowers search for and negotiate better terms. For instance, policies
that improve the ﬁnancial literacy of borrowers may help them in their negotiations. Geraldi et al.
(2010) argue that ﬁnancial illiteracy played an important role in the rate of foreclosures in the U.S.
housing crisis.
In Canada, these borrowers could be informed as to the beneﬁts of using brokers. Since brokers
have ﬁduciary duties towards borrowers, their use helps borrowers search for and negotiate bet-
ter terms. This is in contrast to the U.S. where, except in California, brokers do not have ﬁduciary
duties. As a result, and as documented by Hall and Woodward (2010) there is considerable confu-
sion surrounding the mortgage process generally, and the role of brokers in particular.30 Although
there has been some discussion about the possibility of assigning ﬁduciary duties to brokers in the
U.S., language initially appearing in the Dodd-Frank Act that would have done so was ultimately
removed.
Another potential avenue for lowering search costs is through the use of the internet. The de-
velopment of the internet and other technological improvements may lower the costs of gathering
information and of getting approval for particular rates. This could result in a shift in the distri-
bution, similar to what is described in Hortac ¸su and Syverson (2004). We would expect that this
would increase bargaining power for all borrowers, but especially those with greater search costs,
resulting in a higher degree of competition.
30The Wall Street Journal (Hagerty (2007)), for example, highlights the debate in the U.S. over mortgage brokers –
most consumers believe that brokers represent them, however, as the president of the Colorado Mortgage Lenders
Association states “The mortgage broker does not represent the borrower.”
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28APPENDIX A. LARGE CANADIAN MERGERS
1993. On January 1, 1993 TD Bank acquired, under duress, Central Guaranty Trust. Even though
Central Guaranty Trust had a poor balance sheet, there was substantial interest by several ﬁnancial
institutions in acquiring its assets from Central Capital Corporation, which owned 87 per cent
of trust. At the ofﬁcial auction TD won over the joint bid from National Bank, Canada Trust,
and Montreal Trust. Given the conditions of the Central Guaranty Trust balance sheet (they had
very high risk mortgages and commercial lending activities), the Canadian Deposit Insurance
Corporation provided ﬁnancial support to TD in the takeover. In terms of branches, TD acquired
156 locations. TD also inherited nearly 11 billion dollars in deposits.
Soon after TD Bank’s acquisition of Central Guaranty Trust, the second largest acquisition (in
terms of assets) in Canada occurred, with Royal Bank acquiring Royal Trust. In 1992 Royal Trust’s
parent company, Royal Trustco, had experienced liquidity issues, and in early 1993 announced
it was looking for a buyer of the trust company. RBC’s takeover of Royal Trust was announced
on March 18, 1993 and consummated on September 1, 1993. The Royal Trust brand was well-
known and well-respected in the ﬁnancial industry. Furthermore, most people believed that RBC
was a perfect match for Royal Trust. They shared the same name, colors, and both had distin-
guished histories. Royal Trust had 150 branches at the time of the acquisition, largely in Ontario
and Quebec, but also with a signiﬁcant presence in Alberta and British Columbia. According to
Competition Bureau (2003), the RBC-Royal Trust merger was analyzed by the Bureau when it was
ﬁrst proposed. The Competition Bureau did not place any restrictions on the merger.
1994. The Competition Bureau also did not place restrictions on Bank of Nova Scotia’s (BNS)
acquisition of Montreal Trust on April 12, 1994. In this instance BNS acquired 9 billion dollars in
deposits and 125 branches. Montreal Trust had experienced some losses in the early 1990s because
of market value deﬁciencies in the investments and assets, but was considered a sound ﬁnancial
institution and a good purchase by BNS.
1997. On August 14, 1997 Bank of Nova Scotia acquired National Trust and Victoria and Grey
Mortgage Corporation, without restrictions by the Competition Bureau. In this case BNS acquired
nearly 12 billion dollars in deposits and 199 branches. Most of what is known about National
Trust is conﬁdential. We do know, however, that the transaction was valued at approximately
1:25 billion dollars even though National Trust was considered a poorly run institution that had
acquired an excessive number of small, failing trusts throughout the 1990s. It was largely the
mis-management of the infrastructure that led National Trust to look for a buyer.
2000. The last bank merger to be approved in Canada was Toronto-Dominion Banks’ (TD) acquisi-
tion of Canada Trust in 2000. The price tag was roughly 8 billion dollars (TD ﬁnanced the purchase
by issuing 700 million dollars in equity) and it resulted in over 400 branches being acquired as well
as a strong share of the mortgage market. The merger was analyzed by the Competition Bureau
and allowed to be completed under minor conditions. For example, TD had to divest in some
of its branches in three of the seventy-four markets deﬁned by the Bureau (Kitchener-Waterloo-
Cambridge-Elmira, Port Hope, and Brantford-Paris). TD also had to sell CT’s MasterCard credit
card business (they sold the consumer credit card business to Citibank in November 2000). TD
was issuing Visa credit cards at the time of the acquisition, and it was not until 2009 that Canadian
banks could sell both brands simultaneously.
29APPENDIX B. ADDITIONAL TABLES
TABLE 9. Deﬁnition of Household / Mortgage Characteristics
Name Description
FI Type of lender
Source Identiﬁes how lender generated the loan (branch, online, broker, etc)
Income Total amount of the borrower(s) salary, wages, and income from other sources
TDS Ratio of total debt service to income
Duration Length of the relationship between the borrower and FI
R-status Borrowers residential status upon insurance application
FSA Forward sortation area of the mortgaged property
Market value Selling price or estimated market price if reﬁnancing
Applicant type Quartile of the borrowers risk of default
Dwelling type 10 options that deﬁne the physical structure
Close Closing date of purchase or date of reﬁnance
Loan amount Dollar amount of the loan excluding the loan insurance premium
Premium Loan insurance premium
Purpose Purpose of the loan (purchase, port, reﬁnance, etc.)
LTV Loan amount divided by lending value
Price Interest rate of the mortgage
Term Represents the term over which the interest rate applies to the loan
Amortization Represents the period the loan will be paid off
Interest type Fixed or adjustable rate
CREDIT Summarized application credit score (minimum borrower credit score).
Some variables were only included by one of the mortgage insurers.
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n
r
a
t
e
m
i
n
u
s
t
h
e
w
e
e
k
l
y
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
a
c
r
o
s
s
a
l
l
m
a
r
k
e
t
s
.
T
h
e
s
a
m
p
l
e
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
s
a
l
l
c
o
n
t
r
a
c
t
s
w
i
t
h
n
o
n
-
m
i
s
s
i
n
g
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
o
n
e
y
e
a
r
b
e
f
o
r
e
a
n
d
a
f
t
e
r
t
h
e
m
e
r
g
e
r
.
N
e
i
g
h
b
o
r
h
o
o
d
s
w
i
t
h
f
e
w
e
r
l
e
n
d
e
r
s
t
h
a
n
t
h
e
1
%
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
i
l
e
i
n
t
h
e
t
r
e
a
t
m
e
n
t
g
r
o
u
p
a
n
d
m
o
r
e
t
h
a
n
9
9
%
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
i
l
e
i
n
t
h
e
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
g
r
o
u
p
a
r
e
e
x
c
l
u
d
e
d
(
i
.
e
.
l
e
s
s
t
h
a
n
5
o
r
m
o
r
e
t
h
a
n
8
)
.
E
a
c
h
c
o
l
u
m
n
c
o
r
r
e
s
p
o
n
d
s
t
o
a
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
t
c
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
i
v
e
n
e
i
g
h
b
o
r
h
o
o
d
a
s
s
u
m
p
t
i
o
n
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
d
i
n
E
u
c
l
i
d
i
a
n
d
i
s
t
a
n
c
e
.
T
h
e
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
:
i
n
c
o
m
e
,
l
o
a
n
-
s
i
z
e
,
l
o
a
n
/
i
n
c
o
m
e
i
n
t
e
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
,
l
o
a
n
-
t
o
-
v
a
l
u
e
c
a
t
e
g
o
r
i
e
s
(
3
)
,
c
r
e
d
i
t
s
c
o
r
e
c
a
t
e
g
o
r
y
(
5
)
,
r
e
s
i
d
e
n
t
i
a
l
s
t
a
t
u
s
(
i
.
e
.
p
a
r
e
n
t
s
o
r
r
e
n
t
e
r
)
,
b
a
n
k
,
m
o
n
t
h
a
n
d
p
r
o
v
i
n
c
e
d
u
m
m
i
e
s
.
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